How did Liverpool beat Brighton?

First Half 

In Possession

Brighton started the game with yet another formation change. Fabian Hurzeler opted for a 4-2-3-1 formation with Hinshelwood and Baleba operating at the base of the midfield and Gross primarily operating from the 10 position. It is not uncommon for the Brighton coach to match an opponent's formation, but this 4-2-3-1 came with a twist. Usually the width from such a formation would predominantly come from the two wide wingers; in this case, however, Diego Gómez was operating from a much narrower position. Harry Howell was also occasionally drifting inside, with Pascal Gross picking up his trademark right-wing crossing position. Starting formation shown below:

The main premise of such a formation was to try and expose the gaps left by the Liverpool fullbacks. Liverpool traditionally play a very aggressive game (particularly at home) with their two fullbacks holding the width whilst pushing very high. This leaves quite a big gap between the centre backs and full backs, with Gomez, Howell and Gross looking to exploit these spaces. Further to this, Liverpool tend to press in a kind of hybrid 4-4-2 shape with a heavy onus on the RB. With Salah's reluctance to work back alongside Wirtz's starting position, it leaves the right side of Liverpool's defence vulnerable. 

Brighton tried to exploit this by inverting Gomez whilst asking marauding left-back Ferdi to really hold the width high and wide. This would lead to stand-in right-back Curtis Jones facing a 2v1 situation, with the Liverpool defender struggling to pick up both threats. With Gomez drifting inside, Jones preferred to stick to his RB position and mark Ferdi, which meant Brighton enjoyed an extra man in the middle of the park. This helped contribute to an effective build-up when in possession.

I know the inclusion of Harry Howell has been a particular talking point amongst Albion fans, but I believe the recent tactics employed by Fabian Hurzeler hold the answer. With an emphasis on overloading the middle of the pitch as well as Pascal Gross's tendency to drift wide at times, I believe the inclusion of the Worthing-born youngster is mainly due to his strengths in pockets as well as picking up the ball in tight areas. Minteh, as an example, is a traditional winger and doesn't possess the skill set to operate in the 10 spaces.

Build up depicted below:

Out of Possession

Brighton originally used a 4-4-2 shape when pressing from goal kicks. Gross alongside Babis would press Van Dijk and Konaté with Hinshelwood & Baleba tasked to get tight to their midfield counterparts. This led to a numerical imbalance in midfield with the impressive Alexis Mac Allister consistently drifting into space, offering himself to the two CBs to initiate the Liverpool build-up. Whilst Gross tried to block the passing lane into the Liverpool number 10, both the quality of the player and the intelligence of the movement proved to be too much for the Brighton press.

4-4-2 Shape shown below

When Liverpool predictably enjoyed spells of possession within the Brighton half, the south coast side looked to employ a deeper defensive line whilst dropping into a 4-5-1 shape. You do not often see Brighton resort to such measures, but given the quality of player at Arne Slot's disposal, I feel it is a very sensible tactic. Gross, Baleba and Hinshelwood would man-mark the Liverpool midfield trio, leaving Liverpool struggling to create clear chances. 

Deeper 4-5-1 shape shown below:

With halftime approaching, Hurzeler tweaked the pressing shape higher up the pitch; the German changed to a 4-5-1 shape, allowing the Liverpool centre halves to have possession. This led to a few more issues, however. The new shape meant more emphasis would be placed upon the ageing Pascal Gross, and in particular the German's athleticism was called into question. Alexis Mac Allister continued to drift into space demanding the ball, but this time he had Gross following. Still, this did not deter the Argentine, who would consistently receive passes into feet before breezing past Gross to initiate a Liverpool attack.

Whilst Gross is undoubtedly a supremely intelligent player, his lack of legs really was shown up in this game. Whilst the formation wasn't entirely to blame for the opening Liverpool goal, I did feel, however, the flow of the game was altered, which ultimately led to the breakthrough.

See below 4-5-1 pressing formation

The formation change also led to Harry Howell coming inside to cover for Gross once Mac Allister had breezed past his former teammates' attempt at a press. This left Kerkez free out wide, with the Hungarian enjoying large spaces to run into. To put such onus on such a young player, I felt, was very unfair. It was no surprise that the initial goal did happen thanks to a Kerkez cross with Howell struggling to defend.

See below how this led to Kerkez becoming free.

Second Half

With Liverpool now leading, Brighton decided to alter their pressing approach once more. Hurzeler went back to his initial 4-4-2 shape, but this time he wanted more aggression from the front. This came in the way of a high press with a man-to-man marking in midfield. To combat the numerical advantage in the midfield, Hurzeler asked Dunk to follow Wirtz when the German elected to drift inside and pick the ball up deep. It was a very brave approach and, in my opinion, a flawed one, given the disparity between the two sides.

See below second half shape with Dunk following Wirtz

The decisive goal, I believe, came as a direct result of this new approach from Brighton. The move started with Van Dijk passing the ball to Cody Gakpo. The Liverpool wide man then moved inside and played a simply wonderful pass out wide to Salah. The Egyptian produced an equally brilliant touch inside to the onrushing Dominik Szoboszlai, who capped the move with a worthy finish. It was a brilliant goal but one that was avoidable from an Albion perspective.

Firstly, in my opinion, the Brighton press was far too aggressive too early. Brighton were only trailing their northern counterparts by one goal, so the need to chase the game early in the second half was a naive one. Secondly, Jack Hinshelwood is picking up Florian Wirtz, which means the German midfielder has created space for the eventual goal scorer. If Hinshelwood had stuck with Szoboszlai, then this goal very well may have been prevented. Lastly, due to the aforementioned error from Hinshelwood, it left both Gomez and Dunk too much ground to make up, as they were unable to put the goal scorer under any real pressure.

See below for initial build up and pass in Gakpo

See below the pass by Gakpo and the run of Liverpool goalscorer. Hinshelwood drawn to Wirtz

Lastly the touch inside that frees the scorer. See how much space he is afforded due to one bad decision by Hinshelwood

Key Issues faced

Brighton faced a difficult task in an attempt to get a result at a ground they, like many others, routinely struggle at. But what key issues stood out to me?

The main issue I would like to point out is within the Liverpool build-up. Liverpool is a team that prefers to build from the back and dominate possession. The consistent ease with which Liverpool bypassed the Brighton press ensured that the Scouse side could consistently start threatening attacks. The biggest issue for me was the decision to start Gross. Yes, the German has undoubted quality on the ball, but this was realistically a game where Brighton should have ceded possession. Gross was continuously exposed in the out-of-possession setup due to his lack of legs.

I felt the decision to play Babis as a lone forward to be a baffling one. The Greek forward is hardly known for his strength or hold-up play, and to leave him isolated up against Van Dijk along with Konate was asking too much from the youngster. 

Another issue I'd like to highlight was the importance of Kerkez. As mentioned above, the unfavourable position the shape put Albion youngster Harry Howell in led to Kerkez being a continuous threat.

The changes further lost control. Just after the hour mark, Hurzeler introduced Minteh, Mitoma & Rutter at the expense of Baleba, Howell & Gomez. Whilst already 2-0 and a comeback unlikely, the shape changed to a more recognised 4-2-3-1 shape with the wide players staying high, which led to further loss of control. Instead of the numerical superiority Gomez provided (through him inverting), you had also lost the athleticism Baleba gave the team. Attacks became rarer, as did possession in high areas, with Liverpool seeing the game out very comfortably.

See below for the new shape.

Summary